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Reply Brief of Petitioner 
 Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State 
submits this brief in reply to new matters raised in Defendant’s responsive 
brief.  The State does not concede any matters not addressed in the reply, but 
believes those matters are adequately addressed in the State’s opening brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT, LIKE THE COURT OF APPEALS, 
INCORRECTLY APPLIES STRICKLAND’S PERFORMANCE 
STANDARD BY ASSUMING THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL 
HAD A SUBJECTIVE STRATEGY IN MIND RATHER THAN 
EVALUATING WHETHER DEFENSE COUNSEL’S 
ACTIONS WERE OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE   
Defendant murdered his wife by shooting her three times at point 
blank range.  He admitted killing his wife, but relied on an extreme emotional 
-2- 
distress defense.  Among other things, he testified that three days before he 
killed his wife, she had threatened him, and that when he saw her by their 
gun safe and noticed that a Beretta was missing, he took the threat seriously 
and believed that she meant to harm him.  When Defendant began to testify 
about his wife’s alleged threat, however, the State objected that the testimony 
was inadmissible hearsay. 
Defense counsel did not counter that the exact words were admissible 
non-hearsay because they were not offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted.  The trial court sustained the State’s objection, so the jury never 
heard the alleged threat’s exact words. 
On appeal, Defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for not 
making the non-hearsay argument.  The court of appeals agreed, reasoning 
that defense counsel was deficient because admitting the specific words of 
the threat—which are not part of the record—would only have strengthened 
his defense.  The court of appeals began and ended its analysis with whether 
defense counsel’s strategy was sound. 
 But as the State showed in its opening brief, whether the representation 
advances sound strategy is a consideration, but it is not determinative of 
Strickland’s deficient performance element. Rather, the determinative 
question “is not whether counsel’s choices were strategic, but whether they 
-3- 
were reasonable.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000). Defendant 
nevertheless defends the court of appeals’ reasoning. He assumes that 
defense counsel’s subjective strategy was to introduce the specific words of 
Teresa’s alleged threat: “There can be no doubt,” Defendant contends, that 
“defense counsel was attempting to admit the evidence.” Br.Resp.22.1 And 
because defense counsel did not “make a basic evidentiary argument” to 
overcome the prosecution’s hearsay objection, Defendant concludes, defense 
counsel necessarily performed deficiently. Br.Resp.29. In Defendant’s eyes, 
counsel is deficient whenever he fails to do what he sets out to do. Id.  
 The record, however, does not demonstrate either that defense 
counsel’s subjective strategy was to introduce the content of Teresa’s alleged 
threat or that defense counsel did not respond to the prosecutor’s hearsay 
objection due to unreasonable preparation to meet it. And because the record 
does not support either contention, Defendant did not rebut Strickland’s 
strong presumption that defense counsel performed effectively. The court of 
appeals erred by holding otherwise.  
                                              
1 Defendant asserts that the “state, defense, and Court of Appeals all 
agreed that the threat was not hearsay and should have been admitted.” 
Br.Resp.10. The State, however, did not agree that the content of Teresa’s 
alleged threat “should” have been admitted. Id. Rather, it agreed only that 
the content of the alleged threat was not hearsay. 
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 But even if the record did reflect that defense counsel’s subjective 
strategy had initially been to introduce the specific content of Teresa’s alleged 
threat yet failed to do so, Defendant still did not prove that his counsel 
performed deficiently. The ultimate inquiry under Strickland is not whether 
defense counsel had a specific strategy in mind (and failed to accomplish it), 
but whether defense counsel’s actions were objectively reasonable. Because 
reasonably competent counsel could have proceeded as defense counsel did 
here, Defendant did not meet his burden to prove that his counsel was 
objectively deficient. The court of appeals erroneously held that he did. 
A. Defendant did not rebut Strickland’s strong presumption that 
his counsel had a valid strategic reason not to respond to the 
prosecutor’s hearsay objection. 
 It is Defendant’s burden to prove that his counsel performed 
deficiently and that he was prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687–89, 694 (1984). “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance” 
is “highly deferential,” and counsel is “strongly presumed to have rendered 
adequate assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-690.  
 Strickland’s strong presumption exists because “[t]here are countless 
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.” Id. at 689.  
“Representation is an art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one 
case may be sound or even brilliant in another.” Id. at 693. Indeed, “[d]ifferent 
-5- 
lawyers have different gifts,” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 
(11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1204 (2001), and “[e]ven the best criminal 
defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  
 In addition, the trial process “contains a myriad of complex decisions” 
that often are made in the heat of trial and made with the benefit of 
experience, knowledge, and information that is not apparent on the record. 
United States v. Forston, 194 F.3d 730, 736 (6th Cir. 1999); Harrington v. Richter, 
562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (explaining that counsel “observed the relevant 
proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the 
client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge”); Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 
115, 125 (2011) (noting that counsel’s actions can be influenced by “insights 
borne of past dealings with the same prosecutor or court”). Reviewing courts 
thus must be careful of “the potential for the distortions and imbalance that 
can inhere in a hindsight perspective.” Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 125. As a result, 
the United States Supreme Court has mandated that “deference must be 
accorded to counsel’s judgment.” Id. at 126. Counsel is “strongly presumed 
to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in 
the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
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 It is the defendant’s burden to rebut this presumption. Id.; Burt v. 
Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013) (stating that “burden to ‘show that counsel’s 
performance was deficient’ rests squarely on the defendant”) (internal 
citation removed). A defendant cannot assume that his counsel acted out of 
neglect or incompetence. He must prove it. See State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, 
¶30, 253 P.3d 1082 (“[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a 
speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality.”) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). And “[i]t should go without saying that 
the absence of evidence cannot overcome the ‘strong presumption that 
counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.’” Titlow, 134 S. Ct. at 17 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see also 
Sallahdin v. Mullin, 380 F.3d 1242, 1248-1251 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
Sallahdin failed to overcome the “strong presumption of constitutionally 
reasonable conduct” where there was “‘no discernible explanation for 
counsel’s failure to call’” expert witness; counsel’s incompetence could not be 
assumed); Fretwell v. Norris, 133 F.3d 621, 623-624 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
counsel’s inability to remember reasons for his performance did not rebut the 
presumption that he performed effectively); Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1314 n.15 
(explaining that an “ambiguous or silent record is not sufficient to disprove 
the strong and continuing presumption” that counsel performed effectively).  
-7- 
 Here, the court of appeals did not hold Defendant to this burden. 
Defendant assumes both that defense counsel subjectively intended to 
introduce the specific words of Teresa’s alleged threat and that counsel did 
not respond to the prosecutor’s hearsay objection out of neglect or lack of 
knowledge. But the record does not support either assumption. 
 First, the record does not reflect that defense counsel intended to 
introduce the specific words of Teresa’s alleged threat. For example, defense 
counsel never mentioned Teresa’s alleged threat in his opening statement. See 
R.277:17-29. If this were “the linchpin of the defense,” as Defendant and the 
court of appeals contend, one would expect defense counsel to at least 
mention it in his opening statement. Br.Resp.28. He did not.  
 But even more importantly, defense counsel never asked Defendant to 
tell the jury exactly what he claimed Teresa said to him. Instead, defense 
counsel asked Defendant only “who threatened who?” and “After you saw 
the safe opened, . . . what were you thinking?” R.278:113-114. It was 
Defendant’s responses—not defense counsel’s questions—that drew the 
prosecutor’s objections. Id. Again, if defense counsel’s strategy had been to 
introduce the specific wording of Teresa’s threat, one would expect defense 
counsel to specifically ask Defendant what those words were, just as defense 
counsel did when he asked witnesses to repeat out-of-court statements in 
-8- 
other contexts. See R.278:118 (asking Defendant, “what did you tell your 
mother?”); R.278:177 (asking Defendant’s mother, “what did [Defendant] tell 
you?”). 
 Second, the record does not reflect that defense counsel did not 
respond to the prosecutor’s hearsay objections out of neglect or lack of 
knowledge. Indeed, just four pages of transcript after defense counsel did not 
respond to the prosecutor’s hearsay objection at issue here, defense counsel 
responded to a hearsay objection to different testimony with the very non-
hearsay argument that Defendant argues defense counsel should have made 
but did not. Br.Resp.19. During this later exchange, defense counsel 
responded to the prosecutor’s hearsay objection by arguing that the 
testimony was “not being offered for the truth of the matter” and “was also 
his present sense impression and his state of mind.”  R.278:118-119.  This 
rebuts Defendant’s surmise that defense counsel “lack[ed]” the “basic 
evidentiary knowledge” to get the specific words of Teresa’s threat admitted 
as non-hearsay. Br.Resp.19. 
 Likewise, when defense counsel was questioning the witness following 
Defendant and the prosecutor again objected that defense counsel was 
eliciting hearsay, defense counsel exhaustively argued that the testimony was 
admissible under the rules of evidence. R.278:177-184. Again, if defense 
-9- 
counsel did not understand hearsay or the rules of evidence as Defendant 
asserts, one would not expect defense counsel to have been able to make these 
evidentiary arguments.  
 The record thus does not support Defendant’s assertion that defense 
counsel intended to introduce the content of Teresa’s alleged threat but was 
unable to do so because he did not understand the rules of evidence. Quite 
the opposite. The record supports the conclusion that defense counsel did not 
intend to introduce the content of Teresa’s alleged threat. See Yarborough v. 
Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (“When counsel focuses on some issues to the 
exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical 
reasons rather than through sheer neglect.”); Richter, 562 U.S. at 109 (same). 
 And even if there were some basis in the record to suggest that defense 
counsel initially intended to introduce the specific words of Teresa’s threat, a 
competent attorney could have reversed course. Here, defense counsel 
elicited Defendant’s unrebutted testimony that (1) Teresa threatened him, 
and (2) the threat made him fear for his life.  Counsel could have concluded 
that this was enough.  He may have determined that the specific words of the 
threat would have diluted this testimony if the jury could have concluded 
-10- 
that they were insufficient to make someone actually fear for their life.2  Or 
he may have determined that, facing a judge who was hostile to admitting 
the evidence, he had the critical information before the jury anyway, and he 
would preserve his hearsay battles for evidence that mattered more.  Defense 
counsel, not the court of appeals, was best positioned to weigh those risks 
and benefits. And unless no competent counsel would have struck the 
balance as trial counsel did, the presumption of competent representation 
remained unrebutted.  Defendant did not meet that burden and the court of 
appeals did not hold him to it. 
 By assuming that defense counsel’s unwavering intent was to 
introduce this evidence, Defendant and the court of appeals ignored 
Strickland’s directive to not “second-guess” defense counsel’s performance on 
the basis of an inanimate record. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. And they 
contradicted Strickland’s mandate that defense counsel is strongly presumed 
to have acted in the exercise of his professional judgment.  Id.; Munguia, 2011 
UT 5, ¶30 (“[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative 
matter but must be a demonstrable reality.”); Sallahdin, 380 F.3d at 1248-1251 
(holding that Sallahdin failed to overcome the “strong presumption of 
                                              
2 Defense counsel presumably knew what those words were, but they 
are not part of the record. 
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constitutionally reasonable conduct” where there was “‘no discernible 
explanation for counsel’s failure to call’” expert witness; counsel’s 
incompetence could not be assumed); Fretwell, 133 F.3d at 623-624 (holding 
that counsel’s inability to remember reasons for his performance did not 
rebut the presumption that he performed effectively); Chandler, 218 F.3d at 
1314 n.15 (explaining that an “ambiguous or silent record is not sufficient to 
disprove the strong and continuing presumption” that counsel performed 
effectively).  
 The “Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care.” 
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. The court of appeals failed to do so here. And in 
failing to do so, the court of appeals’ precedent “threaten[s] the integrity of 
the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve.” Id. (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–690). The Court should reverse. 
 But even if defense counsel had subjectively intended to introduce the 
content of Teresa’s threat and failed to do so, the court of appeals still erred. 
To prove deficient performance, Defendant must not only rebut the 
presumption that defense counsel acted in the exercise of his professional 
judgement, but also prove that counsel’s performance was objectively 
unreasonable. The court of appeals erred by not holding Defendant to this 
burden.  
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B. The determinative question under Strickland’s performance 
standard is whether defense counsel’s actions were objectively 
reasonable, not whether counsel had a specific strategy in 
mind. 
 Both Defendant and Amicus Curiae fault the State for “imagin[ing] a 
different case where the defense does not intend to admit the threat 
evidence.” Br.Resp.13; Amicus Br.17.3 According to them, because the 
“defense’s objective” was to introduce the content of Teresa’s alleged threat, 
the question “is not . . . why some other attorney might conclude it was 
reasonable trial strategy to not admit the evidence.” Br.Resp.13. In their view, 
“the correct inquiry—the one conducted by the Court of Appeals—is whether 
                                              
 3 Amicus Curiae further faults the State for relying on United States 
Supreme Court precedent that involved federal habeas corpus review. See 
Amicus Br.23-24. Although Amicus Curiae seems to agree that Strickland—a 
federal habeas corpus case—controls, it asserts that later Supreme Court 
cases “have no bearing on the Strickland analysis” because the question in 
those cases “was not whether a trial counsel’s performance violated 
Strickland, but instead whether the State court’s holding that it did not violate 
Strickland was unreasonable.” Amicus Br.23. The State agrees that the 
question in current federal habeas cases reviewing state decisions is whether 
the state court’s application of the Supreme Court’s Strickland standard was 
reasonable. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (“The pivotal question is whether the 
state court's application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable.”). But 
to determine whether the state court’s application of the Strickland standard 
was reasonable, the Supreme Court must first articulate what that standard 
is. Relying on the Supreme Court’s articulation of the Strickland standard in 
federal habeas cases, then, is perfectly appropriate. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
697 (“The principles governing ineffectiveness claims should apply in federal 
collateral proceedings as they do on direct appeal or in motions for a new 
trial.”). Amicus Curaie offers no authority providing otherwise. 
-13- 
trial counsel’s failure to know and properly argue the hearsay rules regarding 
evidence that was critical to the strategy he chose fell below an objective 
standard.” Amicus Br.17 (emphasis added). In other words, if counsel picks 
a strategy and fails to correctly advance it, counsel is constitutionally 
ineffective. This is not the Strickland standard.  
 As a threshold matter, as shown, the assumption that defense counsel’s 
intent here was to introduce the specific words of Teresa’s alleged threat is 
not supported by the record. But it does not matter. The determinative 
question under Strickland is whether counsel’s performance was objectively 
reasonable. 
 To establish deficient performance under Strickland, a defendant must 
show that his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 688. Strickland turns on defense counsel’s “acts 
or omissions.” A defendant “must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that 
are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (emphasis added). “The court must then determine 
whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were 
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. (emphasis 
added). See also Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315 n.16 (“To uphold a lawyer’s 
-14- 
strategy, we need not attempt to divine the lawyer’s mental processes 
underlying the strategy.”).  
 This requires a defendant to “persuad[e] the court that there was no 
conceivable tactical basis for counsel’s actions.” State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶6, 89 
P.3d 162 (emphasis in original, quotations and citations omitted). The State is 
not required to articulate a reasonable explanation for counsel’s acts or 
omissions.  Nor does a defendant succeed merely because this Court cannot 
conceive of a tactical explanation for counsel’s performance.  Rather, “‘the 
defendant’” always bears the burden to “‘overcome the presumption that, 
under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound 
trial strategy.’”  Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, ¶19, 165 P.3d 1195 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see also Titlow 134 S.Ct. at 17 (explaining that 
“burden to ‘show that counsel’s performance was deficient’ rests squarely on 
the defendant”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  And when it is possible 
to conceive of a reasonable tactical basis for trial counsel’s actions, then a 
defendant clearly has not rebutted the strong presumption that his counsel 
performed reasonably.  See Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶7. 
 The ultimate inquiry under Strickland’s deficient performance standard 
thus “is not whether counsel’s choices were strategic, but whether they were 
reasonable.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 481 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 
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Richter, 562 U.S. at 110 (explaining that Strickland inquires “into the objective 
reasonableness of counsel’s performance, not counsel’s subjective state of 
mind”). This inquiry necessarily requires the reviewing court to “imagine” 
whether a reasonable attorney in the same or similar circumstances could 
have proceeded the same way as defense counsel.  Br.Resp.13. In other words, 
the court must “affirmatively entertain the range of possible ‘reasons [a 
defendant]’s counsel may have had for proceeding as they did.’” Cullen v. 
Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 196 (2011) (internal citation, alteration, and quotation 
marks omitted); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“the general presumption 
of objective reasonableness requires a petitioner to ‘overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy’”) (citation omitted and emphasis added). If 
a hypothetical attorney could have reasonably decided to take the same 
course of action as defense counsel, defense counsel’s representation met 
constitutional requirements. See Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1320 n.27 (explaining 
that counsel does not perform deficiently if fully informed and competent 
“hypothetical counsel” could take same action); Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 
1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (explaining that Strickland requires 
reviewing court to consider “whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial 
could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial”); 
-16- 
Cosio v. United States, 927 A.2d 1106, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(explaining that “[i]f a competent defense attorney in trial counsel’s shoes 
reasonably could have” proceeded as defense counsel, he “cannot be 
deemed” to have provided “constitutionally deficient performance”); 
Sallahdin, 380 F.3d at 1250-1251 (entertaining possible reasons why counsel 
would not have called expert witness); United States v. Fortson, 194 F.3d 730, 
736 (6th Cir. 1999) (“We can conceive of numerous reasonable strategic 
motives for the decision.”); “State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 138 (Minn. 2009) 
(citation omitted) (“Counsel acts within that objective standard of 
reasonableness when the attorney provides the client with the ‘representation 
by an attorney exercising customary skills and diligence that a reasonably 
competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.’”).4 
                                              
 4 The reasonable care standard in negligence cases is analogous. See 
Overby v. Union Laundry Co., 100 A.2d. 205, 208 (N.J. App. 1953) (“In the field 
of negligence we compare and contrast the conduct of the accused with that 
which the hypothetical person of reasonable vigilance, caution and prudence 
would have exercised in the same or similar factual conditions.”); Sutkowski 
v. Tymczyna, 2010 WL 4721156 *7U (N.J. App. 2010) (“The defendant’s 
conduct is compared with that which a hypothetical person of reasonable 
vigilance would do under the same or similar circumstances.”). This standard 
is objective because “it charts a course for judging people equally and it is 
easier to prove than a state of mind.” 1 Modern Tort Law: Liability and 
Litigation § 3:19 (2d ed. 2017) Indeed, “[i]f the law is to be objective, the norm 
of conduct must be objective.” 1 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 
3:19 (2d ed. 2017). Thus, “[c]onsistent with the objectivity of the law, liability 
depends on the quality of the act rather than the state of mind of the actor.” 
Id.   
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 This can be true even if defense counsel failed in his chosen strategy. 
True, defense counsel’s subjective intent can be relevant. See Chandler, 218 
F.3d at 1320 n.27 (“[W]hen we refer to trial counsel’s testimony explaining his 
personal mental processes . . . we are not crediting his testimony as absolutely 
true; but we point to this lawyer’s testimony as illustrating the kinds of 
thoughts some lawyer in the circumstances could—we conclude—reasonably 
have had.”). This is so because to show his counsel’s performance “fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, he 
must show that “no competent attorney” would have acted similarly.  Moore, 
562 U.S. at 124; Harvey v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1239 (11th 
Cir. 2011) (explaining that counsel is deficient only when “counsel’s error is 
so egregious that no reasonably competent attorney would have acted 
similarly”). For if a competent attorney reasonably could have followed the 
same course of action as defense counsel, it does not matter that defense 
counsel actually fell short of his subjectively chosen course of action. See State 
v. Sessions, 2014 UT 44, ¶21, 342 P.3d 738 (concluding that trial counsel 
performed reasonably despite “his unawareness of the law” because 
“operative inquiry is whether the ‘actual representation would still have been 
within the range of objectively reasonable representation,’ even if counsel 
had been ‘aware of [the law]’”); Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1048 (10th 
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Cir. 2002) (holding that defense counsel’s performance was not objectively 
unreasonable even though he was subjectively unaware of the law because a 
hypothetical, “fully informed attorney could have” performed the same 
way); Harich v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1464, 1470-1471 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc) 
(holding that counsel’s ignorance of potential defense was not deficient 
performance because fully competent attorney aware of the defense “could 
well have taken action identical to counsel in this case”); partial overruling on 
other grounds recognized by Davis v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 1471, 1482 (11th Cir. 
1997); Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 138 (Minn. 2009) (citation omitted) (holding that 
counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable even though 
counsel signed affidavit stating that it had not occurred to him to object to 
evidence); Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994) (explaining that 
even “if many reasonable lawyers would not have done as defense counsel 
did at trial, no relief can be granted on ineffectiveness grounds unless it is 
shown that no reasonable lawyer, in the circumstances, would have done 
so”).   
 This makes sense. As the Eleventh Circuit explained, if two attorneys 
take the identical action, but for different reasons, it would be illogical to label 
one as constitutionally acceptable and the other constitutionally deficient: 
If some reasonable lawyer might not have pursued a certain 
defense or not called a certain witness, we fail to understand 
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why we would order a new trial on the ground that the actual 
lawyer had not used the defense or witness in the first trial: at 
the new trial, a different lawyer (even a reasonable one) might 
again not use the witness or defense. If two trials are identical, 
one should not be constitutionally inadequate and the other 
constitutionally adequate.  
Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315 n.17.  
 Thus, it would not matter here if defense counsel subjectively intended 
to introduce the content of Teresa’s alleged threat but was unable to do so 
because he did not understand the rules of evidence. As argued in the State’s 
opening brief, a competent attorney still could have reasonably concluded 
that he need not respond to the prosecutor’s hearsay objection by arguing 
that the words were non-hearsay. By this time, the judge had already 
sustained several hearsay objections and counsel could have reasonably 
concluded that he was not likely to succeed in getting the words of the threat 
admitted. R.291:113. And where the jury had already heard ample testimony 
that Defendant believed Teresa had threatened him, he “thought the threat 
was serious,” and he believed Teresa intended to harm him, defense counsel 
could have reasonably concluded that getting the specific wording of Teresa’s 
threat was not so necessary to the defense that it was worth pressing the issue 
further. R.278:113-114, 117. Indeed, a reasonable attorney could conclude that 
he already had more than enough to add the threat piece to the larger extreme 
emotional disturbance puzzle—Defendant testified that he was afraid of 
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Teresa because she had threatened him, he believed she had a gun, and he 
believed she intended to use it. 
 And certainly, while the record is silent as to the precise words of 
Teresa’s alleged threat, defense counsel knew what they were. Richter, 562 
U.S. at 105 (“Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the 
relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted 
with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge.”). And knowing 
what the specific words of the threat were, counsel could have reasonably 
concluded that introducing the precise words would not have been so 
materially more helpful to Defendant’s defense that it was critical to get them 
into evidence. By leaving the specific words to the jury’s imagination, counsel 
could magnify the effect of Defendant’s testimony, allowing the jury to 
believe that the threat was greater than what it actually may have been. 
 Defendant concedes as much. In his response, Defendant admits that 
“the details of the threat were significantly less important than the source of 
the threat.” Br.Resp.35. The State agrees. And because the jury was well 
aware that Teresa was the source of the threat, by Defendant’s own account, 
defense counsel did not perform deficiently. For if appellate counsel—a 
competent, reasonable attorney—could come to the same conclusion as trial 
counsel, Defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing that “no 
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competent attorney” would have acted similarly. Moore, 562 U.S. at 124. The 
court of appeals erred in holding otherwise. 
II. 
DEFENDANT, LIKE THE COURT OF APPEALS, 
MISAPPLIED STRICKLAND’S PERFORMANCE 
STANDARD BY SPECULATING THAT THE UNKNOWN 
CONTENT OF TERESA’S ALLEGED THREAT WOULD 
HAVE UNDERMINED CONFIDENCE IN THE OUTCOME 
Defendant also defends the court of appeals’ prejudice analysis. He 
argues that the court of appeals correctly determined that Defendant was 
prejudiced because the “jury did not hear the one piece of evidence that 
would have contextualized and legitimized [Defendant]’s fear that Teresa 
was going to harm him” and “why Teresa’s other acts . . . would have caused 
him extreme distress.” Br.Resp.43.  
This argument conflicts with Defendant’s concession that knowing the 
specifics of the threat was far less critical than knowing who made it. 
Br.Resp.35. By Defendant’s own account, the jury had all the critical 
information; therefore, the additional information would not have 
sufficiently changed the evidentiary picture to make a more favorable 
outcome reasonably probable. 
In any event, the threat is not part of the record.  And without knowing 
the content of Teresa’s threat, this is only speculation. Strickland requires 
more. 
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To prove prejudice on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the 
defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The “likelihood of a different result must 
be substantial, not just conceivable,” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112, such that 
counsel’s error “‘actually had an adverse effect on the defense.’” Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 693). And 
the defendant’s proof of prejudice “cannot be a speculative matter but must 
be a demonstrable reality.” Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ¶30 (quotations and citation 
omitted). That is, he “has the difficult burden of showing . . . actual prejudice.” 
State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1259 (1993) (emphasis in original). 
 In assessing whether a defendant has carried his burden, appellate 
courts “must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. This “requires . . . a probing and fact-specific 
analysis.” Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 955 (2010) (per curiam). At a minimum, 
the reviewing must consider each of counsel’s alleged deficiencies in the 
context of the inculpatory evidence presented at trial and demonstrate how 
counsel’s alleged deficiency would have so altered the evidentiary landscape 
that a more favorable outcome would be reasonably probable. Id.  
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 The court of appeals failed to apply this standard. And Defendant fails 
to take into account that without having the content of the threat in the 
record, the conclusion that Defendant was prejudiced was mere speculation. 
Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ¶30. Indeed, there was no basis to reject the possibility 
that the content of the threat was just as likely to cause the jury to conclude 
that Defendant’s fear was unfounded. 
A. This court can—and should—reverse without addressing 
defendant’s rule 23b motion. 
 While Defendant asserts that the record “is adequate for the purposes 
of conducting a Strickland analysis,” he argues that this Court cannot reverse 
without “having his 23B motion ruled on.” Br.Resp.39-40. He thus asks that 
if this Court were not to affirm, it should permit him to file his rule 23B 
motion in this Court or that it remand to the court of appeals so that court 
may rule on his 23B motion. See Br.Resp.38-40, 44-45. This Court should do 
none of the above.  
 It is “well settled” that this Court may affirm a judgment of a lower 
court if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record. 
State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ¶31, 994 P.2d 1243. This Court has thus “never” 
remanded ineffective assistance of counsel claims to the court of appeals. Id.  
“Remanding this purely legal question to the Court of Appeals would waste 
time, money, and judicial resources.” And where remanding “would likely 
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result in the case coming back again to this Court,” that “procedure would 
advance no sound policy of judicial review, whether by certiorari or 
otherwise.” Id.   
 Here, remanding the case to the court of appeals to rule on Defendant’s 
rule 23B motion would “advance no sound policy of judicial review.” Id.  
Even if he were granted a remand, Defendant cannot meet his burden to 
prove ineffective assistance of counsel.  
 Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, “provides a mechanism 
for criminal defendants to supplement the record with facts that are 
necessary for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel but which do not 
appear in the record.” State v. Griffin, 2015 UT 18, ¶ 17, ---P.3d---(emphasis 
added). But remands are only available for entry of findings of fact, which 
are “necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.” 
 A remand is not “necessary” to a “finding” of ineffective assistance of 
counsel here, for Defendant cannot meet his burden to prove ineffective 
assistance of counsel in any event. Defendant’s 23B proffer only sought a 
remand to add to the record the specific words of Teresa’s alleged threat. But 
the jury already knew what Defendant now concedes is the critical 
information—“the details of the threat were significantly less important than 
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the source of the threat.” Br.Resp.35. As a result, Defendant cannot show that 
all competent attorneys would have made a non-hearsay objection even 
knowing the content of the alleged threat. This alone is enough to defeat his 
Strickland claim—and a remand is unnecessary to make this determination. 
 And similarly, even with a remand, Defendant would not be able to 
show prejudice. The jury had the critical information—Defendant told the 
jury that Teresa had threatened him and that the threat made him fear for his 
life. No matter how threatening the specifics of Teresa’s alleged threat could 
be, they were unlikely to have added enough additional detail to overcome 
all the other evidence undercutting the extreme emotional disturbance 
theory. Richter, 562 U.S. at 111. And even the specifics would have required 
the jury to believe Defendant’s uncorroborated testimony weighed against 
third-party witness accounts and Defendant’s recorded 911 call coldly 
reporting that he had killed his wife for reasons wholly unrelated to any 
threat. 
 This Court should reverse. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in the State’s opening 
brief, the Court should reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. The 
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Court should then remand to the case to the court of appeals to resolve 
Defendant’s verdict-urging instruction claim. 
 Respectfully submitted on February 16, 2018. 
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